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INTRODUCTION
Epistemic Authority is a mature work of a  leading epistemologist and 
philosopher of religion (and metaphysician, too, but that character 
doesn’t feature in this story). It is a work primarily in epistemology with 
applications to religious epistemology. There are obvious applications 
of the notion of epistemic authority to philosophy of religion. For, on 
the face of it, the notion of some kind of ‘epistemic authority’ may serve 
as a conceptual anchor for our understanding of faith. Indeed, there is 
ample historical precedent for this. Faith, says Locke, is ‘the assent to any 
proposition ... upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God, in 
some extraordinary way of communication’.1 In later Lockeans, ‘credit’ 
is often rendered ‘authority’, and the terms were used synonymously 
at the time of his writing.2 One of the beauties of Locke’s view is its 
reductionism, that is, it’s parsimony, which is a species of elegance and 
therefore beauty. Zagzebski’s notion is more high-octane than Locke’s. 
In this essay I will do four things. In Section 1 I will describe two kinds 
or notions of authority or at least two usages of the word ‘authority’. In 
Section 2 I  will describe Zagzebski’s use of one of these notions, the 
non-Lockean one, to ground the reasonableness of religious belief. In 
Section 3 I will give four arguments against her view. In section 4 I will 
reply to her critique of Locke. The upshot, in my view, is that though 
we learn much (very much indeed) from Epistemic Authority (about 
both testimony in general and religious testimony in particular among 
many other things), a more Lockean approach to the nature of faith is 
still preferable.
1 Locke, Essay, Book IV, Chapter XVII, section 2.
2 See, for but two examples, Leland (1740: 15), and Meadly (1809: 16).
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I. TWO KINDS OF AUTHORITY
1.1 Expert Authority
The first kind of authority I  shall call expert authority. This usage is 
usually met in a  sentence such as ‘She is an  authority on horses’, or 
‘He is an authority on the game of golf ’, or ‘She is an authority on 19th 
Century Russian Novels’, or ‘He is an authority on first century Palestine’. 
In each of these sentences, the word ‘authority’ could be replaced with 
‘expert’ without addition or loss. What we mean when we say such 
things is (at least) that so and so knows lots about that subject. And we 
also intend to convey (most of the time)3 that that person is a reliable 
source of information  – they are very likely to state the truth of the 
matter concerning that area – and so their testimony can be relied upon4 
(= we can trust them in the matter = believing them is warranted = their 
says-so is evidence that it is so).
Notice, though, that if X is an  expert it is still an  open question 
whether and in what manner X’s opinion, expert though it be, should 
affect your opinion. For you yourself may be an expert! And of course 
being an  expert on some subject  – taking the sentences above as 
paradigmatic  – comes in degrees. So imagine two dials side by side. 
One dial represents A’s expertise on a subject, another represents B’s. Let 
the dials have ten ‘clicks’ labelled from ‘1’ to ‘10’. Here are the possible 
pairs of settings representing the relationship between A’s expertise to B’s 
expertise.
{<1,1>,<1,2>,<1,3>,<1,4>,<1,5>,<1,6>,<1,7>,<1,8>,<1,9>,<1,10>,
<2,1>,<2,2>,<2,3>,<2,4>,<2,5>,<2,6>,<2,7>,<2,8>,<2,9>,<2,10>,
<3,1>,<3,2>,<3,3>,<3,4>,<3,5>,<3,6>,<3,7>,<3,8>,<3,9>,<3,10>,
<4,1>,<4,2>,<4,3>,<4,4>,<4,5>,<4,6>,<4,7>,<4,8>,<4,9>,<4,10>,
...
<10,1>,<10,2>,<10,3>,<10,4>,<10,5>,<10,6>,<10,7>,<10,8>,<10,9>,<10,10>}
3 There are certain areas – like nutrition – where the people with the most knowledge 
tend to change their minds frequently or cannot make up their collective mind at any one 
time: ‘Don’t eat eggs! Eggs will kill you!’ ‘No, eat all the eggs! Eggs will save you!’ Between 
this and matters of great expert agreement, there is a spectrum.
4 Some people make much ado about the notion of reliance, but I do not. What I mean 
by reliance here has nothing to do with some kind of right to resent those who get it 
wrong. Rather, I mean something like if you used that person as a source of information 
to place bets in the relevant field, you’d come out ahead in the long run.
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This set of ordered pairs describes a  ‘discrete continuum’ (if you 
will) between two individuals with no expertise (if we let 1 represent 
the average base unit of knowledge) to two individuals who are each 
experts. Or we could think of the pairs as representing a continuum of 
ratios of the expertise of A to B (with a lot of redundant pairs). So the 
last line would represent A as being very much an expert compared to B. 
Then as we move down the last row, B ‘catches up’ with A in expertise 
step by step. So expertise is clearly not a binary notion. And, of course, 
expertise is not a discrete notion. It is truly continuous so instead of the 
matrix represented by the set of ordered pairs above, there is an infinite 
array of possibilities. If we want to try to imagine this array, the best we 
can do is look at an illustration of the diagonal argument that the rational 
numbers are countable.
 
2/1 
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8/1 
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And of course this leaves out infinite infinities of irrational numbers 
that might express the ratio of A’s expertise to B’s. The weight of A’s 
testimony might be 6.262 times that of B (or so we may suppose, it 
doesn’t affect the point). I have gone to pains with the visuals in order to 
illustrate how, well, infinitely short a binary model of expertise would fall 
from the mark.
Someone who is an  authority (to some degree) in this way has 
authority (to some degree) in this way. And since this kind of authority – 
the kind an expert has (we might as well call it ‘expertise’) – is based 
on various good-making features of their beliefs,5 we can sensibly call it 
5 It wouldn’t have to be knowledge, and often likely isn’t. What’s really important is 
that their beliefs be sufficiently likely to be true, on some relevant notion(s) of ‘likely’.
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epistemic authority. There is nothing at all mysterious about this kind of 
epistemic authority. We meet it in the doctor’s office, in the classroom, at 
church, at work, and many other places in daily life.
The Lockean thesis that faith is belief on the basis of the authority6 
of the proposer, when ‘authority’ is used to express expert authority (as 
I believe Locke intended it) is a sensible, familiar idea. It explains why 
‘walking by faith, not sight’ can be reasonable. I’ve never seen the Great 
Wall of China. But someone who has been there many times can tell 
me something about it, say that it is wider in inner Mongolia than it is 
down in Beijing, and my (reasonably) believing his testimony. That is, 
we are (epistemically) trusting her (like we would a thermometer). We 
are having (epistemic)7 faith that though we have not seen it with our 
own eyes, we yet believe that it is so. Note that it is an open question 
whether this kind of belief counts as knowledge. Sometimes, it seems 
clear enough, that belief on the basis of expert testimony counts as 
knowledge. Other times, it will be less clear. But on this notion of faith 
some of the things we believe by faith we know by faith. The matter of 
first importance, though, is that belief on the basis of epistemic authority 
is perfectly reasonable. In non-binary terms, we are warranted in having 
great confidence in many items we take by faith. We can sensibly assign 
them high degrees of probability. This is the notion of epistemic authority 
I find in Locke and find to be true. My position is that this notion of 
epistemic authority is the best model for ‘faith that’ in religious belief. 
Not that on my account trusting an authority that p is just a species of 
believing that p. Trusting (epistemically) in some authority is just using 
them as a  source of justification. And someone needs evidence that 
someone is an expert to reasonably treat them as an authority. This is 
very much in the spirit of Hume as well. For this reason, and because 
it is a  very unpopular term, I’ll call the view I’m advocating here the 
‘Enlightenment’ view. It is important to note here that I do not accept 
the standard narrative according to which Locke and Hume removed 
all communal notions from their epistemology, which Zagzebski seems 
to place a lot of stock in (p. 112). However, I am very glad we share this 
common ground: ‘I  think Locke is right that faith is tied to belief on 
6 Really it is upon the perceived authority, but that is merely a wrinkle.
7 Epistemic faith I  take to be a  species of ordinary belief. I  affirm the tradition of 
distinguishing between ‘faith that’ (what I  have called ‘epistemic faith’) and ‘faith in’ 
which is a kind of interpersonal trust of individuals. ‘Saving faith’ or ‘trusting in God/
Christ’ is a species of ‘faith in’. I am not treating ‘faith in’ in this essay.
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testimony, and the rationality of faith is therefore tied to the rationality 
of belief on testimony.’ (p. 112)
The obvious sense of the Enlightenment view makes it hard to 
understand Zagzebski’s final words in her chapter about religious 
epistemic authority: ‘Religious faith is impossible to explain, much less 
justify, on the evidence view of testimony. That view forces us to either 
redefine faith as belief on a certain kind of evidence, as Locke did, or 
we must say that faith is nonrational.’ (p. 179) That faith (that) is a kind 
of belief on a kind of evidence is run of the mill, as the examples above 
show. So there is no need for any redefinition. Things are fine just as they 
are. And the following is also unfair to Locke:
Taking a belief from Scripture or from a religious tradition would not be 
justified at all according to the extreme egoist. That is to say, the belief 
would not be justified because it is from Scripture or tradition. If the 
belief is justified, it is because it is justified by the use of my faculties 
anyway. The fact that the same belief is included in Scripture or the 
tradition is irrelevant. (p. 167)
What’s true is that it would not be justified just because it is from Scripture 
or tradition, for there are many scriptures and many traditions, and one 
must have some reason – independent of the mere fact that it is Scripture 
G or Tradition T – to believe G or T on the matter rather than X or Y. 
But from this it does not follow that it is irrelevant that it is included 
in Scripture or tradition for the simple reason that had Scripture or 
tradition not included it I never would have known it (or not as easily or 
as clearly), since my faculties are by themselves insufficient to attain to 
many of the truths revealed in Scripture and tradition. Also, it’s because 
Scripture and tradition bear a certain relation to God Himself that they 
are worthy of belief. So on any reasonable view at all one does not believe 
something just because it is from Scripture or tradition. Below, I  will 
defend Locke’s view on authority and choice.
1.2 Juridical Authority
The other kind of authority I  will call juridical authority. This is the 
authority you might think a  Sergeant in the Army has over a  Private, 
a CEO has over an office manager, that deans seem to think they have 
over professors, and that Police would have over Citizens if a government 
were just. I’m dubious of the notion of juridical authority as such. I’m 
inclined to think that as moral agents no one can have authority over 
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us  – including God  – unless we grant it to them. But I  don’t need to 
defend that here.
‘What is essential to authority’, says Zagzebski, ‘is that it is a normative 
power that generates reasons for others to do or to believe something 
preemptively’ (p.  89). The key term is ‘preemptively’. She notes the 
presence of pre-emption in Joseph Raz’s notion of juridical authority. ‘[T]
he fact that an authority requires performance of an action is a reason for 
its performance that replaces other relevant reasons and is not simply 
added to them’ (p. 93, emphasis added). Then she presents her epistemic 
analogue:
Preemption Thesis for epistemic authority
The fact that the authority has a belief p is a reason for me to believe 
p that replaces my other reasons relevant to believing p and is not 
simply added to them.
She observes that this principle might be thought to be impossible: We 
must ignore our own reasons. But she says we do not ignore our reasons 
when we pre-empt them. ‘In fact, it is because I am not ignoring them 
that I see that the belief of the authority has a certain status vis-à-vis my 
other reasons.’ (p. 98) It is all well and good to say this, but what is utterly 
mysterious is how we can focus on our reasons (the opposite of ignoring 
them) and yet they have no motive force (apart from malfunction). How 
can we look a reason ‘square in the face’ and remain (non-degenerately) 
unmoved? There are deviant cases, of course, but this is supposed to 
happen systematically and virtuously. She relies on a dubious difference 
between first-person reasons and third-person reasons, saying that they 
do not aggregate (pp. 56-58 ). But why not? Why can’t reasons of different 
kinds aggregate? They seem to in ordinary cases of testimony (where we 
don’t have to think of the testifier as an  authority). I  see grocery bags 
on the floor and conclude that Jim when to the market. Jill tells me he 
did. I  rightly believe more firmly when Jill’s testimony is added to my 
experience. Very different kinds of reasons aggregate. Furthermore, 
her distinction rests on the distinction between first- and third-person 
reasons, but I reject the notion that there are any third-person reasons 
but rather that all reasons are first-personal (see Dougherty and Rysiew 
2009, Conee and Feldman 2004, Heumer 2001, Swinburne 2001). It is this 
dubious alleged difference between first- and third-person reasons which 
supports her reasoning in her chapter on religious faith that the evidence 
theory of testimony is false (p. 168). A word about that is in order.
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Zagzebski adopts the common sentiment that there is more to 
testimony than evidence. ‘As Moran (2005) has pointed out, there is no 
explanation for feeling let down when the testimony is false if testimony is 
evidence.’ (p. 108) Of course there is more to testimony than evidence. It’s 
a human practice, so there is bound to be a social normative dimension. 
The question is whether this ‘more’ plays any role in the justification 
of beliefs obtained from testimony. And the social stuff itself is part 
of what makes testimony evidence-generating. I  can tell, instinctively, 
when someone is representing themselves as having a certain degree of 
warrant for a proposition, p, expressed by an utterance they make. I am 
attending, often unconsciously, to features of the social situation which 
themselves are of evidential significance. Grice’s rules of interpretation 
are psycho-social in nature, and the textbook Gricean interlocutor uses 
social norms as premises in an argument for the conclusion that S has 
certain information relative to p.
Zagzebski says (p. 118) the ‘egoist’ or proponent of the Enlightenment 
view should or can accept her main theses regarding testimony. (p. 116)
Justification Thesis 1 for the Authority of Testimony (JAT 1)
The authority of a  person’s testimony for me is justified by my 
conscientious judgment that I am more likely to satisfy my desire to 
get true beliefs and avoid false beliefs if I believe what the authority 
tells me than if I try to figure out what to believe myself.
Justification Thesis 2 for the Authority of Testimony (JAT 2)
The authority of another person’s testimony for me is justified by my 
conscientious judgment that if I believe what the authority tells me, 
the result will survive my conscientious self-reflection better than if 
I try to figure out what to believe myself.
When I  first read these principles I  was perplexed as to how they 
depended on any of the prior material. So I was a bit relieved when she 
said that Lockeans could accept them or modified versions of them. 
However, I can’t quite tell if this is correct, because she says this:
Suppose I hear speaker S say that p and reasonably take that to be either 
direct or inductive evidence that p . I then believe p on S’s testimony. If 
I also have evidence that S is more likely to get the truth whether p than 
I am, then I ought to believe p on her testimony, and I ought to believe 
preemptively. (p. 118)
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Because of the weighting model I presented above, I just don’t think there 
is any need at all for preemption. That is, I see no reason at all to just set 
aside my own reasoning per se. There are only two scenarios where I can 
see this as reasonable. First, there is the case where I  have thought it 
through but gain evidence sufficient to make certain that I have absolutely 
no idea what I’m doing. In this case, I should abandon any hope in my 
reasoning and give it no weight. But if I am less than certain that there 
is no hope, then I ought to give my reasoning some weight (and, as is 
clear, the maths allows me to give it arbitrarily low weight). The other 
scenario isn’t technically of the same kind, that is it is not a case of setting 
aside reasoning at all, but it is the analogue in the realm of action. This 
is the scenario where I am considering whether to investigate a matter 
and think it through. Before I  am to begin I  learn that you are in so 
much better an epistemic position than me that it would be a waste of my 
time and resources to even bother about it. The odds of my investigation 
and reasoning affecting my outcome credence by a  significant margin 
are so low that thinking about it myself has negative expected utility. 
In this case I ‘set aside’ my attempt to think through the matter myself. 
This can make perfect sense because I haven’t yet gone to the effort and 
therefore have no reasons to ‘set aside’. Outside of these two cases – the 
one merely theoretical, since I don’t think one should ever assign 1 or 
0 to any proposition – and the other in the realm of action – I cannot 
think of any reason to ever utterly discount our own reasoning. Unlike 
the former case, the latter may be quite widespread, and I hypothesize 
that this kind of phenomenon is what is driving the bus, and it is just 
a confusion to think of it as relating to epistemic reasons. The reasons in 
this case are practical reasons.
There is much left out of this characterization which is important, 
especially Zagzebski’s notion of the communal in religious authority. 
However, that material is built upon the distinction between theoretical 
and deliberative reasons and, especially, on the notion of epistemic 
authority as pre-emptive, wherein one sets aside one’s own reasoning. 
My arguments below will be aimed primarily at the pre-emptiveness of 
juridical epistemic authority.
2.1 THE ARGUMENT FROM PARSIMONY
My first argument in favour of the Enlightenment view over the Juridical 
or Pre-emption view is an argument from parsimony.
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Parsimony argument
(1) The notion of expert epistemic authority is completely non-
mysterious and one both sides are committed to.
(2) Expert authority is sufficient to explain the relevant epistemic 
practices (esp. the reasonableness of accepting testimony).
(3) If 1 and 2, then unless there is compelling reason to posit a new, 
mysterious notion of epistemic authority, one should not do so.
(4) There is no compelling reason to posit a new, mysterious notion 
of epistemic authority.
Therefore,
(5) There we should not posit a new, mysterious notion of epistemic 
authority.
Premise 1 seems secure. Premise 3 is an expression of the Principle of 
Parsimony: don’t posit new things without due cause. Partial defence of 
2 and 4 come from remarks above.
2.2 The argument from the aim of belief
The second argument begins from the familiar notion that belief, in some 
sense or other, ‘aims’ at truth. I actually think belief aims at empirical 
adequacy (Dougherty 2014), but I  suspect that Zagzebski and many 
others hold some kind of view that will do the trick.
B1 Belief aims at truth.
B2 If belief aims at truth, then if a mental state doesn’t aim at truth, 
that state isn’t one of belief. [B1]
B3 If a mental state doesn’t aim at truth, that state isn’t one of belief. 
[B1, B2 MP]
B4 Any state that is formed (wholly) in response to considerations 
other than signs of truth (i.e. evidence, broadly construed) is not 
aimed at truth.
B5 Any state that is formed (wholly) in response to considerations 
other than evidence, isn’t one of belief. [B3, B4 HS]
B6 The state of assent formed in response to authority is not a response 
to evidential considerations (else it wouldn’t really be epistemic 
authority).
B7 The state of assent formed in response to authority is not a state of 
belief. [B5, B6 HS]
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All of the basic premises of this argument seem true by definition to me, 
so I’m unsure what to even try to defend (or how I would do it).
2.3 Degrees of Authority
Epistemic authority, as Zagzebski conceives it, is binary in a certain way. 
It appears that you should set aside your own reasoning when you rely on 
an epistemic authority in her sense. It is not, as it would be with expert 
authority in my sense, combined and weighed with your own judgment. 
She says, ‘a small difference between myself and the putative authority is 
not likely to be sufficient to ground authority’ (p. 96). The idea seems to 
be that there needs to be a large difference between one and a putative 
authority before one pre-empts one’s own reasoning. Presumably, prior 
to crossing this critical threshold one continues to rely on one’s own 
reasoning. But this seems strange. It ignores the difference between small 
differences in expertise and not-so-small differences in expertise.8
On the generalization of testimonial evidence I have provided 
(Dougherty 2013), weighing one’s own reasoning against the epistemic 
authority is as easy as calculating a student’s final grade. Say Maria is an 
expert with respect to some class K of propositions to which p belongs 
(and is the only relevant category in this case), and she is .8 confident 
that p.  It seems to me, let us suppose, that she is being too cautious. 
My own judgment is that on the evidence available to Maria and me, 
one should rate p at .9.  However, I recognize that Maria is an expert to 
the following degree: her opinion should count twice as much as mine. 
My final credence in p then is figured thusly: (.8 + .8 + .9)/3 = .833. 
The method is the same even if there is only ‘a small difference’ between 
Maria and me.  If her opinion should count for 110% of mine9 we have 
(.9  +  1.1(.8))/2.1 = .848. As expected, this is just slightly below the 
straight (unweighted) average of our credences, .85.  This is a fully general 
8 There is also the problem of the vagueness itself, which I don’t have space to go into 
in any detail here. The problem is that there will be no bright line such that from exactly 
that line on we pre-empt our own reasoning and below it we don’t. But we must either 
pre-empt or not pre-empt. So there seems to be a necessary mismatch between reality 
and practice on the pre-emption model.
9 This is actually consonant with Zagzebski’s ‘Principle of Epistemic Trust in Others’ 
(p. 186), and she does talk about degrees of trust (p. 188), but then she goes back to 
binary language when talking about resolution of disagreement: ‘Given the argument of 
this book, it is reasonable to resolve the conflict in favor of what I trust the most when 
I  am thinking in the way I  trust the most’ (p.  189) and that resolving disagreements 
means we need to ‘target the belief that should be given up’ (p. 191).
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account of how to weigh authority.  Furthermore, this method can handle 
multiple competing authorities of various weights.  It is just like figuring 
a slightly more complex grade with more quizzes, a midterm and a final, 
all of different weights. And this is a very good result, since epistemic 
authority clearly comes in degrees. It is hard to see how Zagzebski’s 
account can handle degrees of epistemic authority in such an elegant way 
or even at all. ‘Why isn’t it more reasonable’, she asks, ‘to add my other 
reasons to the balance of reasons, perhaps weighing the authority’s belief 
more heavily than my other reasons? Isn’t the authority’s belief just one 
more piece of evidence that I  put into the mix of my total evidence?’ 
(p. 99) She favours pre-emption over weighing. This seems like exactly 
the wrong result in light of the existence of degrees of authority.
III. REJOINDER TO ZAGZEBSKI ON BEHALF OF LOCKE
Zagzebski considers Locke’s objection to a duty to believe in obedience 
to authority stemming from the fact that belief does not depend upon 
the will. In objection, she offers essentially this argument.
N1 Beliefs have norms.
N2 If beliefs have norms, then we can exercise control over them.
Therefore,
N3 We can exercise control over beliefs.
In defence of N1 she says that we teach norms to students (p. 87). It’s not 
clear what norms she is referring to. Here is the sort of norm you might 
think she has in mind (to a student who is writing a research paper, say): 
Base your thesis on adequate research. But this comes to little more than 
the conjunctive injunction Do research and have it in mind when writing. 
But this isn’t a norm of belief at all. This is a norm of writing. We might 
get more specific with When you write down your thesis, think about what 
evidence there is for it amidst your research. That is at least an instruction to 
think about something. Though this is not an injunction to form a belief, 
it can be expected to result in beliefs for a properly functioning person. 
So I’m going to ask you right now to think about when your birthday is. 
The odds are, being an agreeable sort of reader, you complied. And odds 
are if you did think about it you spontaneously formed the belief that 
your birthday was on such and such a day. The formation of the belief 
itself was spontaneous, it was not up to you to do or not to do. There 
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is likely nothing you could do to resist it. So the belief was unfree, not 
something you were responsible for. Yet it was something over which 
you had some kind of positive control. For any given number within 
a certain limit, you can quickly comply with a request to form the belief 
that it is not prime. You do this not by taking direct aim at the formation 
of a belief but rather by directly bringing it about that you are thinking 
about either some evidence for some target proposition or by simply 
thinking of the content of some self-evident proposition.
The above fits will the term ‘reflective self-control’, which Zagzebski 
sometimes uses to describe the kind of control she thinks we have over 
belief. But it is hard to see what application this could have for the idea 
of epistemic authority in the juridical sense (vs. the expert sense). For if 
the belief is formed in virtue of one’s responsiveness to ordinary reasons, 
then there is no role played by juridical authority. So even if one was 
being obedient to juridical authority in engaging in the act of reflection, 
that isn’t the salient explanation of the formation of the belief. At least the 
dominant explanation is evidential. Someone, in an attempt to get me to 
believe Goldbach’s conjecture, might order me to go into a room. Once in 
the room I see Goldbach’s conjecture written on the wall quite large and 
come to believe it. We would hardly highlight the juridical authority of 
the one who sent me to my room as the dominant epistemic explanation 
of my belief in Goldbach’s conjecture. The juridical authority merely 
occasioned it. So though there is a certain kind of guidance control over 
belief, it is not of the sort to provide a model for pre-empting reasons.
CONCLUSION
My position is that God’s authority is the authority of the expert, like the 
expert on horses, who has no jurisdiction at all, whereas one who does 
have jurisdiction may lack authority due to ignorance (the latter claim 
is not strictly necessary for my argument). There is not much the Pope 
can actually do to me, but has ‘moral authority’ because he is a reliable 
source of information about what to do in life generally. (And I have 
also made a vow of obedience to the Church when I was confirmed 
as a Catholic, but I freely made that vow, so the juridical authority it 
gives rise to is not a problem for my view.) We are wrong to model 
God’s authority (or the Church’s authority, which ultimately derives 
from God’s authority) on that of juridical authority. The reason to obey 
God in general is not that he is the ‘Big Boss’ with so much power, 
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but rather because as a loving God he wants what is best for us and as 
an omniscient God he always knows what that is. And so it is, Lockeans 
say, with belief. We should believe what God says or the Church says 
not because of a position they have over us but rather because we have 
good reason to believe that God and the Church want the best for us 
and God always and the Church usually knows what that is (the Church 
within its defined sphere).10
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